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This paper tests whether logically equivalent risk formats can lead to different health state utilities elicited by 
means of the standard gamble (SG) method. We compare SG utilities elicited when probabilities are framed in 
terms of frequencies with respect to 100 people in the population (i.e., X out of 100) with SG utilities elicited for 
frequencies with respect to 1,000 people in the population (i.e., Y out of 1,000).  We found that utilities were 
significant higher when success and failure probabilities were framed as frequencies type “Y out of 1,000” rather 
than as frequencies type “X out of 100”. This framing effect, known as Ratio Bias, may have important 
consequences in resource allocation decisions.  
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‘Framing’ refers to the wording and/or other means to present logically equivalent information. A ‘framing effect’ 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) arises when alternative framing of this logically equivalent information produces 
different decisions. Evidence to date suggests that this framing effect is a common phenomenon affecting both 
hypothetical and real decisions made by patients and physicians (see Edwards et al., 2001, for a review).   
One aspect of information that is often presented is risk – the probability of an event, such as a cure or side-effect 
resulting from treatment.  In the case of risk information, empirical evidence suggests several types of framing 
effect. First, preference reversals may occur when equivalent risk information is presented in a negative or a 
positive frame (i.e. as a gain or a loss) (Eraker and Sox, 1981; O’Connor et al., 1985; O’Connor, 1989; Banks et 
al., 1995; Redelmeier et al., 1993; Llewellyn-Thomas et al., 1995; Gurm and Litaker, 2000; Amstrong et al., 
2002). Second, quite different decisions over alternative treatments can emerge when the same information is 
presented as relative risk, absolute risk, or the number-needed-to treat (Forrow et al., 1992; Malenka et al., 1993; 
Bucher and Weinbacher, 1994; Hux et al., 1994; Sarfati et al., 1998; McGettigan et al., 1999). Third, numerically 
equivalent risk formats (e.g. frequency versus percentage) can lead to inconsistent preferences (Slovic et al., 
2000, Schapira et al., 2004). Some research has indicated that frequency formats are more easily understood 
than probability formats (e.g., Bowling and Ebrahim, 2001). The use of frequency formats is supported by those 
authors (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage and Gigerenzer, 1998; Hoffrage et al., 2000) that have 
suggested that, for diagnostic inference, such as the determination of pre- and post-test probabilities, frequency 
formats are easier for people to use than percentage formats. However, some research has shown (Denes-Raj 
and Epstein, 1994) that some people are also subject to biases using frequency formats. The “ratio-bias 
phenomenon” (RBP) is a paradigmatic case.  
The RBP suggests that when having to evaluate the likelihood of an event, subjects have a tendency to focus on 
the numerator, disregarding the denominator.  This bias has not received much attention in medical decision 
making despite its potential relevance. For example, some (e.g. Barrat et al, 2005) describe the consequences of 
screening mammography in terms of number of cancers diagnosed in a group of 1000 women, while others 
(UHMS, 2004) describe the outcomes in terms of events in a group of 10,000 women, and yet others as the 








the potential benefit of mammography screening will look different in these three cases even if the likelihood of 
events is exactly the same.  
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether, and how, the RBP may influence utility derivation. 
Specifically, to test if utilities elicited through the standard gamble (SG) method are susceptible to the RBP.  This 
is important to determine, as the SG method is quite frequently used to elicit von-Neumann Morgenstern utilities 
for individual decision making and has been used to estimate population utilities in instruments like the Health 
Utility Index (Torrance et al., 1995).  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the RBP and offer a psychological explanation for it. 
In section 3 we hypothesize that SG utilities elicited when probabilities are framed in terms of frequencies with 
respect to 1,000 people in the population will be higher than SG utilities elicited for frequencies with respect to 
100 people in the population. This prediction is based on the joint effect of, at least, four motivations for the 
presence of the RBP phenomenon: small number effect, numerosity, saliency and the affect heuristic. Section 4 
describes the methods and results of two experiments designed to test the potential influence of the RBP in SG. 









2. Definition and explanation of the Ratio-Bias Phenomenon 
 
In another study Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) showed that, when offered a chance to win $1 by drawing a red 
jelly bean from an tray, people often chose to draw from a bowl containing a greater absolute number, but a 
smaller proportion, of read beans (9 out of 100) than from a bowl with fewer red beans but a better chance of 
winning (1 out of 10). In the case of the win trials, 61% of subjects chose the large tray offering a smaller chance 
of winning (9% vs 10%) and in the case of the lose trials 39% of subjects chose the smaller tray offering a higher 
chance of a loss. When participants were asked to justify their choice, they admitted that this choice went 
contrary to what a rational individual should do, but they felt they had a better chance when there were more red 
beans.  
Other research has shown that this bias is not a mere curiosity of laboratory experiments with students. Slovic et 
al (2000) showed that 40% of clinicians refused to discharge a mental patient when violence risk was 
communicated as “20 out of every 100 patients similar to Mr. Jones are estimated to commit an act of violence”, 
but only 20% refused to discharge the patient when risk was explained as “2 out of every 10 patients similar to 
Mr. Jones are estimated to commit an act of violence”.  Yamagishi (1997a) found a clear inconsistency in risk 
judgements provided by lay people using frequency formats. In his experiment participants rated a disease that 
kills 1,286 people out of every 10,000 as more dangerous than one that kills 24.14 out of every 100. The RBP has 
also been produced using vignettes [Denes-Raj, V., Epstein, S., and Cole, J. (1994)]. 
 
Numerosity refers to the tendency to judge quantity or probability on the basis of the number of units into which a 
stimulus is divided without fully considering variables like the size of the units (Pelham et al., 1994). Pacini and 
Epstein (1999) use this heuristic in order to explain the RBP. They claim that the experiential system encodes 
and better comprehends absolute numbers (numerosity) than ratios because single numbers are more concrete 
than relations between numbers. However, this heuristic does not explain why people focus on the number in the 
numerator and not in the denominator. One reason provided by Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) is that the 








want to select them (if the outcome is a gain) or avoid them (if the outcome is a loss). The final question is, why 
people focus on one aspect of the numerator (e.g., number of red jelly beans, number of criminals that commit 
violent actions, number of people who die) and not  in the other aspect (e.g. number of white jelly beans, number 
of criminals that do not commit violent actions, number of people who do not die)? One argument that Kirkpatrick 
and Epstein (1992) provide is that red jelly beans are more salient because there are less of them, standing out 
as figure against ground. Another argument provided in Pacini and Epstein (1999) is related to the fact that 
instructions are stated in terms of drawing a red jelly bean.  
The small numbers effect asserts that the experiential system comprehends smaller numbers better than larger 
numbers. In this respect, a 1 in 10 probability conveys the idea of a low probability better than 10 in 100, because 
subjects find it easier to visualize 10 than 100 subjects. The smaller tray gives a better idea than the larger tray 
that a 10% chance is a low probability. For this reason, if the lottery is positive (win if red, nothing if white) people 
choose the larger tray and the opposite if the lottery is negative. Some evidence that probabilities expressed with 
low numbers are easier to interpret is provided in Pelham et al. (1994) where subjects expressed their 
preferences about participating in a lottery where all participants are given one ticket or in another lottery where 
all participants are given 10 tickets. People tend to choose the lottery where they are given 10 tickets if they are 
told that there are 1 million participants but they show indifference between both lotteries when they are told that 
there are only 2 participants. Apparently, with lower numbers they better realize that the chances are the same in 
both lotteries. 
Slovic et al. (2000) explain the results by Kirkpatrik and Epstein (1992) and Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) as a 
manifestation of a mental strategy of “imaging the numerator” (the red beans) and “neglecting the denominator” 
(number of beans in the tray). According to Slovic et al., images of winning beans convey positive affect that 
motivates the choice of the bowl with the greater absolute number of red beans. This mechanism was coined by 
Slovic et al. (2002) as the affect heuristic.  Applying this to their paper they say that 20 mental patients out of 100 
conducting violent acts may evoke more images of harmful attacks than 2 out of 10. The role of affect in 
explaining the RBP also fits within the framework provided by dual process theories since the experiential system 
influences, and is influenced by, affect. Affect determines what is attended to and what is reinforced by the 








Yamagishi (1997a) suggests a combination of two cognitive mechanisms as an explanation to his result (why a 
risk of 12.86% is perceived as higher than a risk of 24.84%): anchoring and adjustment (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974) and base-rate neglect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). Yamagishi argues that people use the numerator 
as an anchor to do subsequent judgment and, simultaneously, tend to reject the base rate.  As 1,286 is higher 
than 24.14 then a risk of 1,286 out of 10,000 is perceived as more dangerous than a risk of 24.14 out of 100, 
even though the former probability (12.86%) is lower than the latter one (24.84%).  The problem is to explain why 
people anchor and adjust from one part of the numerator (the number of bad events) and do not pay enough 
attention to the denominator. The arguments provided above (numerosity, saliency, affect) can explain this. 
We would like to add a further reason to explain the Slovic et al (2000) and Yamagishi (1997a) results, which is 
that they only provided information about the number of people that could commit violence acts or the number of 
people who could die. For example, Slovic et al (2000) did not explain to their subjects that 8 out 10 (or 80 out of 
100) would not commit any act of violence. This way of presenting information may have lead subjects to focus 
on this part of the numerator. Again, this argument is just a description of a fact but the relevant question is why 
this happens; why people apparently do not place enough attention to information (number of people that do not 
die or that do not commit violence acts) that, although it is not explicitly provided, it is implicit in the data. We 
propose two explanations for this effect. One is the motivational concern already mentioned; the number of 
people who die or the number of people who commit violence acts is the main motivational concern. The fact that 
the researchers only provide explicit information about the number of positive events (people who do something) 
and not on the number of negative events (people who do not do something) exacerbates the motivational 
concern. The second also relates to the fact that the experiential system takes a leading role in these kinds of 
questions. As the experiential system is characterized by instinctual thinking we believe that it is easier for the 
experiential system to focus on occurrences (things that happen, like having an accident) than on non-
occurrences (things that do not happen, like not having an accident). If this is true, even if we provide information 
in a balanced way, even if we mention explicitly the number of good and bad events, subjects will focus on the 
number of bad events.  









1.-Numerosity: people understand numbers more easily than ratios. 
Saliency: people concentrate on the number of events that are less frequent. 
3.-Small numbers. People have a better idea of the likelihood of an event expressed in small numbers. 
4.-Biased Instructions: asking people to think in the consequence of a certain kind of event (e.g. drawing a red 
ball). 
5.-Neglect of the base: tendency to forget about the denominator. 
6.-Affect heuristic. People respond by imaging the part of the numerator that is more salient. This effect reinforces 
saliency but needs the former. 
7.-Partial information: they only give explicit information about one part of the numerator (e.g. number of people 
that can commit violence acts and not those that will not commit those acts). 
  
As we have seen, all these reasons have an underlying explanation: all of them are congruent with the idea that 
the experiential system has a leading role in this kind of tasks.  We know proceed to apply this theory to the case 












We can use the above explanations of the RBP in order to generate our hypotheses about the potential influence 
of this bias on SG utilities.  
If we elicit SG utilities asking people the risk of death that they would accept in order to improve their health, then 
all seven reasons provided above will influence the response and utilities will be higher if frequencies are 
expressed using 1000 as the denominator (rather than 100). The reason is that this type of question will make 
people focus on the number of deaths and since this number is higher with 1000 as denominator, subjects will 
accept lower risks and they will produce higher utilities than where the denominator is 100. However, since we 
are interested in eliciting unbiased utilities, we try to avoid some of the reasons that give rise to the RBP. For this 
reason: 
1.  We try to frame the decision in an otherwise neutral way, such that people are not led to concentrate on 
only one outcome (probability of death). We then elicit utilities using a sequence of choices. In this way, 
people do not have to focus on one single component of the numerator. That is, we want to find out N100 
and N1000 such that the lotteries [D, N100; (FH, RL)] and [D, N1000; (FH, RL)] have the same utility as the 
sure outcome (Q, RL). If we ask people which value of N100 or N1000 makes both prospects equivalent we 
are making people focus only on one single number, namely, N100 (N1000). However, if we ask people to 
choose between (Q, RL) and [D, N100; (FH, RL)] or [D, N1000; (FH, RL)] and we keep moving both 
probabilities (of D and of FH) so that we finally reach indifference, we will reduce the chances that 
people just concentrate on N100 (N1000).  
2.  We provide information about both potential outcomes. That is, we provide information about N100 and 









3.  We provide subjects with visual aids to help them think in terms of the total denominator so it is as clear 
as possible that the absolute number of good or bad events is related to the total number of potential 
events.  
 
However, in spite of making every effort to provide information in the most unbiased way possible, the reasons 
behind the RBP cannot be totally eliminated. More specifically, it is hard to imagine how to avoid the “saliency” 
effect and the “small-number” effect (and consequently the affect heuristic). If the event with a lower frequency is 
more salient, there will always be a “saliency” effect except in the case of events with a 50% chance. If the “small-
number” effect is an intrinsic part of human thinking, there will always be a “small-number” effect. This leads us to 
propose two specific hypotheses: 
1.  Existence of the RBP: due to the effect of numerosity, small-numbers, saliency and the affect heuristic, 
SG utilities will be higher when the likelihood is framed in terms of X out 1000 people in the population 
than when it is framed in terms of X out of 100 people.  This is because: A. Smaller numbers convey 
better the idea of small risk. B. Numerosity leads people to concentrate on absolute numbers and not 
ratios. C. Saliency leads people to concentrate on events that are less frequent (number of deaths). D. 
Affect will work more strongly when the absolute number of deaths is higher (although the probability is 
the same). For this reason, we predict that people will accept a lower risk if frequencies are provided in 
terms of N out of 1000 than if they are provided in terms of N out of 100, leading to higher SG utilities. 
The hypothesis about the existence of the RBP will be tested comparing the SG utilities elicited from one 
group (henceforth, USG100) and SG utilities elicited from the other group (USG1,000). Our prediction is that 
USG1,000>USG1,00. 
2.  Intensity of the RBP: according to the “saliency” hypothesis, the influence of the RBP in SG utilities will 
be larger for milder health states than for more severe ones. This is because the saliency of the event 
“death” will be higher in the milder health states since there will be less bad events (deaths) for milder 
health states. There are two ways of interpreting the intensity of the RBP. One is to assume that the 
higher the effect the higher the difference USG1,000-USG1,00.  We would then expect this difference to be 








the difference between the utility of the health state and the utility of full health can be very small. For 
example, if U100=0.99 then the RBP would have “no room” to show up. So another possible way of 
testing the intensity of the RBP is through the ratio: 
) 1 (                     
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For example if U100=0.9 and U1000=0.99 we would consider that the RBP has a higher effect than if U100=0.5 
and U1000=0.59.  In any case, in order to study the relevance of the RBP for economic evaluation of health 
care technologies, (1) is the key ratio since it is the ratio of the benefits of medical treatments.  
Tests  
We split a convenience sample into two groups. We asked participants in one group to set probabilities that yield 
indifference between the gamble [D, N100; (FH, RL)] and in the other for the gamble [D, N1000; (FH, RL)] and sure 
outcome (Q, RL). Overall, four SG questions were presented to each subject, one for each of the health states 
selected. In one group 100 was used as the denominator and in the other group 1,000 was used.   
4. The experiment  
 
-  Sample 
The participants were 200 economics students at the University of Murcia (Spain). They were paid 6 Euro for their 
participation. Responses were collected by face-to-face interview, with the questionnaire pilot-tested prior to the 
actual experiment.   
-  Health states 
We used the EQ-5D health states 22111, 11222, 22222, and 23222. These states are described in Table 1. 
Throughout the experiment, the health states were labeled health state X, W, Z and Y respectively.  
[Insert table 1 about here] 
Given the ordinal structure of the component dimensions in the EuroQol descriptive system, some states are 
logically ordered with respect to others. With the states used here, five such comparisons are possible. It would 








and no worse on any of the other dimensions. In the same way, this ordinal consistency would be expected for 
comparisons of 22111 vs 22222, 22111 vs 23222, 11222 vs 22222, and 11222 vs 23222. Only for comparison 
between 22111 and 11222 there is no a priori expectation of this kind. 
-  Design 
The experiment was run on a computer, which facilitated the use of visual aids and the choice-based SG 
procedure to elicit utilities. In addition, the pilot sessions showed that people found computer assisted personal 
interviews a user-friendly procedure.  
To avoid anchoring biases we split the total sample into two groups of 100 subjects each. One group answered 
four SG questions (one per health state) in which probabilities were framed in terms of frequencies with respect to 
1,000 people in the population, while the other group answered the same questions for probabilities framed as 
frequencies with respect to 100 people in the population. To avoid order effects, the computer randomnly varied 
the order in which the different SG questions were asked. To minimize response errors, subjects had to confirm 
the elicited indifference value after each question. As a preliminary task, participants were asked to rate the 
health states on a visual analogue scale (VAS), with 100 (best imaginable health state) and 0 (worst imaginable 
health state) as endpoints. The principal objective of the VAS was to familiarize participants with the health state 
descriptions and also to have a test that both groups were similar. 
Recruitment of participants took place one week before the actual experiment started. At recruitment, participants 
were handed a practice question. Participants were asked to answer this practice question at home. This 
procedure was intended to familiarize participants with the SG questions. Prior to the start of the experiment, 
subjects were asked to explain their answer to the practice question. When we were not convinced that a subject 
understood the task, we explained it again until we were convinced that he understood the task. 
The formulation of SG questions was the same, regardless of the frequency format used. For example, in the 
case of health state X, the wording of the question (translated from the Spanish) was as follows: 
Suppose that you are experiencing health state X. If you do not receive treatment you will remain in 
X for the rest of your life. However, you can receive a medical treatment (ALFA treatment), that if 
successful, will result in  return to normal health. Nevertheless, ALFA treatment can also fail and 
in this case you will die. We are going to show you different probabilities of success and failure 









The SG procedure was then applied to elicit utilities. Frequencies were displayed using human figures, as 
frequency formats illustrated with human figures have been shown to be easy to interpret and convey a 
meaningful message (Schapira et al., 2001). Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the way indifferences were obtained.  
 
[Insert figures 1 and 2 about here; visual aid] 
Suppose that for the probabilities displayed in figure 1 (5% D, 95% FH), the individual prefers treatment ALFA to 
no treatment. Next the computer would display a new choice (figure 2), where probabilities of success and failure 
would be 10 in 100 and 90 in 100 respectively. Suppose that for these probabilities the individual prefers the sure 
outcome rather than treatment ALFA. Then the computer would present the next choice (10%, D; 90%FH) vs no 
treatment. This iterative procedure would continue until indifference is reached. 
-  Data analysis and statistical methods 
 
As normality was rejected by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test with Lilliefors correction (p < 0.0001), we used 
nonparametric procedures in order to test for the significance of differences between SG utilities elicited for 
frequencies with respect to 100 people in the population and SG utilities elicited with respect to 1,000 people in 
the population.  
We also tested whether the two distributions of SG utilities differed with respect to median, using the Wilcoxon 
Mann-Whitney test. This is one of the most powerful of the non-parametric tests for comparing two independent 
samples (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999).  
 
-  Results 
Table 2 shows means, medians and standard deviations (SD) corresponding to the VAS for each sample.  
[Insert table 2 about here] 
Both samples gave similar values and no significant differences were detected (α=0.05) between medians. It was 
then concluded that both groups have similar preferences for health states. Also in both samples the rankings 
were internally consistent in the sense that state Y receives a lower value than state Z, and both Y and Z receive 
lower values than states X and W. This shows that subjects understood the basic task of valuing health states [A-








Table 3 shows the main results. Utilities elicited from the group in which frequencies were described as “Y out of 
1,000” are consistently higher than utilities elicited from the group in which frequencies were described as “X out 
of 100”.  This tendency is robust for all health states. This was our prior expectation and confirms our hypothesis 
about the existence of the RBP. The second prediction, namely, a stronger effect for milder health states depends 
on the test that we apply. Differences between U1000 and U100 are almost constant and in this sense the strength 
of the effect is constant. However, the ratio of equation (1) is lower for milder health states. This implies that the 
RBP will distort more the utilities of mild health states than the utilities of severe health states, at least if they are 
used for economic evaluation of health care technologies. 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
5. Further  evidence 
Once we had seen the influence of the RBP on the SG utilities we wanted to see if this phenomenon was also 
present in other contexts and in other populations more relevant for public policy. We then conducted a second 
study that had some differences with respect to the first study: 
1.  Subjects were members of the general population. 
2.  The tasks to be performed by subjects were the same that had been previously used in a study 
addressed to estimate the value of a statistical life (VSL) from road accidents in Britain. 
3.  The tasks were a modified SG question characterized by the existence of risk in both parts of the 
question. 
 
-  The sample 
 
We used two sub-samples of the Spanish general population (n=180 each). They were chosen using a quota 
sample method. No statistically significant differences were found between both sub-samples in socio-
demographic characteristics. Responses were collected by face-to-face interviews that were held at subjects 
home. 
 









We used the same health states used by Carthy et al. (1999) in their study of the VSL. They are described in 
Table 4. One difference with our first study is that they did not involved chronic illnesses.  
[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
-  Tasks 
 
Subjects had to conduct two modified SG questions. Both tasks were quite similar. First, they were told that they 
had to suppose that they had been injured in a road accident.  If untreated the injury would result in death. They 
were informed that there were two alternative treatments available. One treatment, if successful would result in 
the hospitalization and prognosis associated with injury W, but if unsuccessful would result in immediate 
unconsciousness followed shortly by death with probability 1 in 1000. The second treatment, if successful would 
result in a return to normal health (NH) within 3-4 days, but if unsuccessful would result in immediate 
unconsciousness followed shortly by death with probability Ψ (> 1 in 1000). So the first task can be represented 
as estimating [Ψ, Death; (1- Ψ), NH] such that it produces the same utility level than [0.001, Death; 0.999, W]. 
The second task was similar to this one. In second case, respondents were asked to assume that without 
treatment they would experience the hospitalization and prognosis associated with injury X. They were also 
informed that there were two alternative treatments available. One treatment, if successful would result in the 
hospitalization and prognosis associated with injury W, but if unsuccessful would result the hospitalization and 
prognosis associated with injury X with probability 1 in 100. The second treatment, if successful would result in a 
return to normal health (NH) within 3-4 days, but if unsuccessful would result in the hospitalization and prognosis 
associated with injury X (> 1 in 100). So the second task can be represented as estimating [ρ, X; (1- ρ ), W] such 
that it produces the same utility level than [0.01, X; 0.99, NH].  
We asked both questions to both groups. However, while question 1 was framed exactly the same in both groups, 
question 2 was framed using different denominators. In group A, the risk was framed in terms of 1 out 100. In 
group B, the risk was framed in terms of 10 out 1000. So question 2 in group A was framed as the value of ρ, that 








value of ρ, that made indifferent gamble [ρ, X; (1- ρ), W] to gamble [10 in 1000, X; 990 in 1000, NH]. Visual aids 
similar to those used in experiment 1 were also used. 
 
-  Hypothesis 
 
According to the RBP as people concentrate in the risk of the bad outcome of the numerator, they would accept a 
lower risk ρ in group B (denominator 1000) than in group A (denominator 100).  
 
-  Results 
 
Table 5 shows means and medians corresponding to both groups. As suggested by the RBP, ρ was lower in 
group B. So while subjects in group A accepted a risk of 37 out of 100, subjects in group B only accepted a risk of 
176 out of 1000.  
[Insert table 5 about here] 
6. Discussion. 
This paper provides new evidence on how ‘irrelevant’ changes in the way we represent health risks can lead to 
inconsistent preferences. We find that utilities were significant higher when risk information was framed using 
1,000 instead of 100 as denominator.  It shows how superficially different frequency frames (e.g. X out of 100 vs 
Y out of 1,000) can distort SG measurements. 
How relevant is this bias for practical decision making? Well, let’s assume we use 1000 as the denominator when 
considering the benefit of curing somebody in health state Y, which is more than 5 times the benefit of curing 
somebody in X  [(1-0.481)/(1-0.902)=5.27]. However, this relative benefit almost halves [(1-0.393)/(1-0.790)=2.89] 
if we use 100 as the denominator. Since there is no reason to prefer frequencies in 100 or in 1000, there is no 
reason to necessarily choose one framing over the other. Of course, if one wishes to deliberately increase the 
apparent relative benefit of Y respect to X, one can use 1000 as the denominator for Y and 100 as the 
denominator for X. This increases the relative benefit of Y to more than six times the benefit of X.  For individual 
decision making, it remains to be seen how this bias can influence medical decisions since there has not been 








Having seen the potential implications of this bias, what can we do in order to avoid it? This depends on the 
perspective taken about the origins of the RBP. The RBP observed in SG values can be explained by the dual-
process theory, such that SG is handled more by the experiential than the rational system. This system works 
using heuristics that, although can do a good job in some decisions, may lead to irrationalities, like choosing a 
dominated lottery.  In the case of preference elicitation for health states, the experiential system leads people to 
focus on just one component of the likelihood of one event. This is logically irrational. However, we do not imply 
that the rational system is totally absent in the elicitation task. For example, the rational system may work trying to 
avoid irrational responses, like accepting a higher risk of death for a health state that is less severe than another. 
This leads to utilities that are internally consistent, as ours. For this reason, we can see at the same time 
consistent (e.g. higher utilities for milder health states) but biased responses. This is similar to the idea behind the 
principle of coherent arbitrariness (Ariely et al., 2003), that apparently rational decisions can be based on arbitrary 
“anchors”.  
If we accept that the above account of the origin of the RBP bias is correct, how can we deal with it? One 
approach, in the spirit of Bleichrodt et al (2001) is to correct the “irrational” SG utilities. Some authors have shown 
that the SG method is affected by loss aversion and probability weighting (Bleichrodt, 2001, 2002). Since we have 
a good understanding of these biases there are quantitative corrections to these biases (Bleichrodt et al., 2001; 
van Osch et al., 2004; Bleichrodt et al., 2005). For example, it has been suggested that utilities should be 
estimated under Prospect Theory and not under Expected Utility. In this way, the bias coming from probability 
transformation can be avoided. This approach assumes that the rational system wants to adhere to expected 
utility and then corrects the experiential system in order to choose according to a rational rule. While in the case 
of some biases affecting SG (loss aversion, probability transformation) this could be the case, we cannot see how 
this correction can be applied to the RBP, since EU has nothing to do with the choice of the denominator. 
Slovic et al (2000) suggest a pragmatic strategy. They suggest using several formats in order to communicate 
risk. Translating this to our case, we need to provide information using several denominators. Of course, this 
complicates the task of eliciting utilities. In order to avoid this complication we may try to confirm the hypothesis 
that people understand small numbers more than large numbers. If this is the case we would undertake the 








accept a risk of death of X out of 100, it would be better to use X out of 10. If people say that they would accept 1 
out of 10 but not 2 out of 10, we know that the indifference point is between 10% and 20%. We can the use larger 
numbers (X in 100, whereas 10<X<20 in our example) if we need a more accurate estimate.  This approach 
reflects the Bleichrodt et al (2001) approach in the sense that it assumes there is a denominator that is 
normatively better than others; the smaller one. It could also be that this is a useful short term solution, and in the 
longer term it might be interesting explore ways to “educate” the experiential system so that these biases can be 
reduced or eliminated. For this, it would be quite helpful to categorize subjects according to how they handle 
conflicts between the experiential and the rational system. It has been shown [Epstein et al  (1996), Pacini and 
Epstein (1999), Frederick (2005), Amstel et al (paper under review)] that some subjects are more prone to 
intuitive thinking and biased judgements than others. If this was the case, it would have important implications for 
individual and social decision making. In individual decision making, those subjects that are more susceptible to 
biases could be made aware of this problem in order that avoid taking biased decisions. In social decision 
making, it should be discussed if preferences of these subjects should or should not be taken into account in 
order to design social policy. 
In conclusion, researchers working in utility measurement should be aware of the existence of this bias since it 
may have relevant consequences for individual and social decision making. We also believe that the RBP can be 
quite useful in understanding better the origin of other biases since it may help to study the way that the rational 
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Figures and tables 
Table 1.  Health states used in the study 
Health state X 
Some problems walking about 
Some problems with performing self care activities (e.g. 
eating, washing or dressing) 
No problems with performing usual activities (e.g. work, 
study, housework, family or leisure activities) 
No pain or discomfort 
Not anxious or depressed 
Health state W 
No problems walking about 
No problems with performing self care activities (e.g. 
eating, washing or dressing) 
Some problems with performing usual activities (e.g. 
work, study, housework, family or leisure activities) 
Moderate pain or discomfort 
Moderately anxious or depressed 
Health state Z 
Some problems walking about 
Some problems with performing self care activities (e.g. 
eating, washing or dressing) 
Some problems with performing usual activities (e.g. 
work, study, housework, family or leisure activities) 
Moderate pain or discomfort 
Moderately anxious or depressed 
Health state Y 
Some problems walking about 
Unable to wash or dress self 
 
Some problems with performing usual activities (e.g. 
work, study, housework, family or leisure activities) 
Moderate pain or discomfort 



























Table 2. Means, medians, standard deviation (SD) elicited by the VAS (subsamples, N=100).  
























































   Note: differences between both groups were not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Table 3. Utilities elicited by the SG (each sub-samples, N=100). Standard deviation (SD)  



































































  0.47 0.59 0.77 0.86 
** Significant different at α=0.01. 
•  Significant different at α=0.05. 
 
Table 4. Injury description cards. 
 
Injury X  Injury W 
In hospital. 
  2 weeks 
  slight to moderate pain. 
 
After hospital 
  some pain/discomfort, gradually reducing. 
  some restrictions to work and leisure 
activities, steadly improving. 
  after 18 months, return to normal health 
with no permanent disability 
In hospital 
  2-3 days 
  slight to moderate pain. 
 
After hospital 
  some pain/discomfort for several weeks. 
  some restrictions to work and/or leisure 
activities for several weeks/months 
  after 3-4 months, return to normal health 











Table 5. Means, medians, T-test and Mann-U by groups. 
 
  Group A  Group B     
Risk  Mean Median Mean Median T-test  Mann-U 
ψ  15.2 
 out of 1000 
5 
out of 1000 
14.8 
out of 1000 
5 
out of 1000  0.911 0.120 
ρ  37.1 
out of 100 
33.5 
out of 100 
176 
out of 1000 
95 
out of 1000  0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
 